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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the physical-layer secu-
rity of a multi-user multi-eavesdropper cognitive radio system,
which is composed of multiple cognitive users (CUs) transmitting
to a common cognitive base station (CBS), while multiple
eavesdroppers may collaborate with each other or perform
independently in intercepting the CUs-CBS transmissions, which
are called the coordinated and uncoordinated eavesdroppers,
respectively. Considering multiple CUs available, we propose the
round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal
user scheduling schemes for improving the security of CUs-CBS
transmissions against eavesdropping attacks. Specifically, the
optimal user scheduling is designed by assuming that the channel
state information (CSI) of all links from CUs to CBS, to primary
user (PU) and to eavesdroppers are available. By contrast, the
suboptimal user scheduling only requires the CSI of CUs-CBS
links without the PU’s and eavesdroppers’ CSI. We derive closed-
form expressions of the secrecy outage probability of these
three scheduling schemes in the presence of the coordinated
and uncoordinated eavesdroppers. We also carry out the secrecy
diversity analysis and show that the round-robin scheduling
achieves the diversity order of only one, whereas the optimal and
suboptimal scheduling schemes obtain the full secrecy diversity,
no matter whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not. In
addition, numerical secrecy outage results demonstrate that
for both the coordinated and uncoordinated eavesdroppers, the
optimal user scheduling achieves the best security performance
and the round-robin scheduling performs the worst. Finally, upon
increasing the number of CUs, the secrecy outage probabilities
of the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes both
improve significantly.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, multi-user scheduling, secrecy
outage probability, secrecy diversity, diversity order.
I. INTRODUCTION
COGNITIVE radio is widely recognized as a dynamicspectrum access technique, which enables unlicensed
users (also called secondary users or cognitive users) and
licensed users (known as primary users) to share the same
spectrum but with different priorities, where the primary users
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(PUs) have a higher priority than the cognitive users (CUs)
in accessing the licensed spectrum [1]-[3]. In cognitive radio
systems, CUs are typically allowed to detect whether or not
the licensed spectrum is being used by PUs through spectrum
sensing functionality and then to access the detected unused
spectrum (referred to as spectrum hole) [4], [5]. Due to the
dynamic nature of cognitive radio, various malicious devices
may participate in the spectrum sensing and access, leading
legitimate users to be exposed to both internal and external
attacks [6]. For example, cognitive radio is supposed to be
capable of adapting its operating parameters to any changes
of its surrounding radio environment. However, a malicious
attacker may intentionally modify the radio environment (e.g.,
by emitting interference) in which the cognitive radio operates,
misleading legitimate CUs and even causing them to mal-
function. Therefore, cognitive radio faces many new security
challenges from all aspects of the networking architecture,
including the spectrum sensing, spectrum access, and spectrum
management.
Physical-layer security [7]-[9] is emerging as an effective
means to protect the communications confidentiality against
eavesdropping attacks by exploiting the physical characteris-
tics (e.g., multipath fading, propagation delay, etc.) of wireless
channels. It has been shown that if the wiretap channel (from
source to eavesdropper) is inferior to the main channel (from
source to destination), the source can reliably and securely
transmit to the destination at a positive data rate (see [10]
and reference therein). In [7], Wyner introduced the notation
of secrecy capacity in a discrete memoryless wiretap channel
and showed the secrecy capacity as the difference between
the capacities of the main channel and wiretap channel. Later
on, Wyner’s results were extended to the Gaussian wiretap
channel in [8] and wireless fading channels in [9] and [11],
where the achievable rate-equivocation region was character-
ized from an information-theoretic perspective. It is noted that
the secrecy capacity of wireless communications is limited
and degraded due to the multipath fading effect. To this end,
considerable research efforts were devoted to improving the
wireless physical-layer security by employing the multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) [12], artificial noise [13], [14]
and beamforming techniques [15]-[17]. In addition, the joint
artificial noise and beamforming design was investigated in
[18] to enhance the wireless physical-layer security, where
the artificial noise covariance and beamforming weights were
jointly optimized with a target secrecy rate requirement. It was
demonstrated that the joint artificial noise and beamforming
approach further improves the wireless secrecy capacity.
As aforementioned, the physical-layer security is examined
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extensively for conventional non-cognitive wireless networks
[9]-[18], but is rarely studied for cognitive radio networks.
The physical-layer security of cognitive transmissions was
investigated in [19]-[21] where the achievable secrecy rates
of the multiple-input single-output (MISO), MIMO and relay
selection were developed for cognitive radio networks. More
recently, in [22], we examined the physical-layer security with
multi-user scheduling for cognitive radio networks in terms
of the ergodic secrecy rate and intercept probability. In this
paper, we explore the physical-layer security of a multi-user
multi-eavesdropper (MUME) cognitive radio network, where
the eavesdroppers may collaborate with each other or perform
independently in intercepting the cognitive transmissions. This
is different from the existing cognitive radio security works
[19]-[22] in the following aspects. On the one hand, we
examine the use of multi-user scheduling for improving the
physical-layer security of cognitive transmissions, whereas
multiple antennas or multiple relays are employed in [19]-
[21] with the aid of antenna array design or relay selection.
On the other hand, we are focused on the secrecy outage
probability analysis of cognitive radio networks in the presence
of both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers,
differing from our previous work [22], where the intercept
probability of cognitive transmissions was analyzed for the
uncoordinated eavesdroppers only. Notice that the intercept
probability was defined in [22] as the probability that the
capacity of the main channel falls below that of the wiretap
channel. By contrast, the secrecy outage probability is the
probability that the difference between the capacity of the main
channel and that of the wiretap channel becomes less than a
predefined secrecy rate (i.e., Rs). It can be observed that the
intercept probability is just a special case of the secrecy outage
probability with Rs = 0, showing that the secrecy outage
probability to be studied in this paper is more general than
the intercept probability analyzed in our previous work [22].
Technically speaking, it is much more challenging to obtain a
closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability than
that of the intercept probability for cognitive radio networks,
especially in the presence of coordinated eavesdroppers.
The following summarizes the main contributions of this
paper. First, we propose the round-robin scheduling, optimal
user scheduling and suboptimal user scheduling to protect the
cognitive transmissions against the uncoordinated and coor-
dinated eavesdroppers. The difference between the optimal
and suboptimal scheduling schemes lies in that the optimal
scheduling assumes the perfect CSI of all links from CUs to
CBS, to PU and to eavesdroppers, whereas the suboptimal
scheduling only needs the CSI of CUs-CBS links. Since
the PU’s and eavesdroppers’ CSI is challenging to obtain
at CUs in practical systems, the suboptimal user scheduling
scheme is more attractive than the optimal user scheduling
from this perspective, although the latter scheme may achieve
a better security performance. Second, we derive closed-form
expressions of the secrecy outage probability for the round-
robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal user
scheduling schemes with a PU’s QoS constraint for both
the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. Last, we
characterize the secrecy diversity orders of these three schemes
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Fig. 1. A multi-user multi-eavesdropper (MUME) cognitive radio network
coexists with a primary network.
through an asymptotic secrecy outage analysis and show that
no matter whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not, the
round-robin scheduling achieves the diversity order of only
one, whereas the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling
schemes obtain the diversity order of M , where M is the
number of CUs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first present the system model of a MUME cognitive ra-
dio network in Section II. Then, Section III proposes the
round-robin scheduling, the optimal user scheduling and the
suboptimal user scheduling in the presence of multiple un-
coordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. The closed-form
secrecy outage expressions of various user scheduling schemes
are also derived for both the uncoordinated and coordinated
eavesdroppers. Next, in Section IV, we carry out the secrecy
diversity analysis of the round-robin scheduling as well as
the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes, followed by
Section V, where numerical secrecy outage results of these
three schemes are provided. Finally, some concluding remarks
are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, a multi-user multi-eavesdropper cog-
nitive radio network consisting of one CBS, M CUs and N
eavesdroppers shares the spectrum that is licensed to a primary
network including one PT and one PR. Throughout this paper,
we consider the use of underlay spectrum sharing, i.e., a CU
and a PT are allowed to transmit simultaneously over the same
spectrum, as long as the interference caused by CU is tolerable
at PR and the quality of service (QoS) of PT-PR transmission
is unaffected. We consider that PT transmits to PR without
power control and a maximum interference power I is assumed
to be tolerable at PR without affecting its QoS. This means
that the interference received at PR from CUi must be less
than the maximum tolerable level I for the sake of protecting
the primary QoS. Considering that CUi transmits to CBS over
the same spectrum band as the PT, we shall limit the transmit
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power of CUi denoted by Pi as
Pi =
I
|hip|2
, (1)
where hip represents the fading coefficient of the CUi-PR
channel. It is pointed out that the simple power control
model given by (1) is widely used in literature [23]-[25]
for characterizing the underlay cognitive radio. As shown in
(1), the transmit power of CUi is a function of the random
fading |hip|2, which makes the closed-form secrecy outage
probability analysis of the cognitive transmissions become
more challenging. Considering a maximum power constraint
P , the transmit power of CUi may be modeled as Pi =
min( I|hip|2 , P ). Since only a constant P is introduced in this
model, it will not result in any additional challenges in the
secrecy outage analysis and, moreover, no new insight into
the secrecy outage probability will be provided, as compared
to the power control model of (1). Thus, we consider the use
of (1) in modeling the CUi’s transmit power throughout this
paper. In Fig. 1, M CUs transmit their data packets to CBS,
which is a typical uplink transmission scenario in cognitive
radio networks [2]. Meanwhile, there are N eavesdroppers
in the cognitive radio network, which attempt to intercept
the packets transmitted from CUs to CBS. For notational
convenience, we denote M CUs and N eavesdroppers by
U = {CUi|i = 1, 2, · · · ,M} and E = {Ej |j = 1, 2, · · · , N},
respectively.
In addition, when a CU and a PT simultaneously transmit to
their respective destination nodes, PT also causes an interfer-
ence to CBS in decoding the CU’s signal. Following [23] and
[26], the interference received at CBS from PT is considered to
be a complex Gaussian random variable under an assumption
that the primary signal may be generated by the random
Gaussian codebook. Moreover, the thermal noise at CBS is
also complex Gaussian distributed. Thus, the interference plus
noise at CBS, denoted by nb, can be modeled as a complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance Nb,
which is represented by nb ∼ CN (0, Nb). Similarly, we
can also model the interference plus noise received at an
eavesdropper Ej , denoted by nej , as a complex Gaussian
random variable i.e. nej ∼ CN (0, Nej ). In the cognitive radio
network shown in Fig. 1, M CUs may access the licensed
band and transmit to CBS using an orthogonal multiple access
method e.g. the orthogonal frequency division multiple access
(OFDMA). Generally speaking, the licensed band is first
divided into multiple subchannels which are then assigned
to M CUs. Given a subchannel, we may need to determine
which CU should be selected to access the subchannel, which
will be discussed in the following Section III. Without loss of
generality, considering that CUi transmits its signal xi to CBS
with power Pi, we can express the received signal at CBS as
yib =
√
I
|hip|2
hibxi + nb, (2)
where hib is the fading coefficient of the channel from CUi
to CBS and nb ∼ CN (0, Nb) represents the interference and
thermal noise received at CBS. Using the Shannon’s channel
capacity formula, the capacity of the main channel from CUi
to CBS can be obtained from (2) as
Cib = log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
). (3)
Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation,
the CUi-CBS transmission may also be overheard by N
eavesdroppers. Thus, the signal received at an eavesdropper
Ej can be written as
yiej =
√
I
|hip|2
hiejxi + nej , (4)
where hiej is the fading coefficient of the channel from CUi
to Ej and nej ∼ CN (0, Nej ) represents the interference and
thermal noise received at eavesdropper Ej . Similarly to (3), the
capacity of the wiretap channel from CUi to Ej is obtained
from (4) as
Ciej = log2(1 +
I|hiej |
2
|hip|2Nej
). (5)
In this paper, we consider two eavesdropping scenarios: 1)
uncoordinated case, where the eavesdroppers are independent
of each other in intercepting the CUi-CBS transmission; and
2) coordinated case, where the eavesdroppers collaborate for
intercepting the cognitive transmissions. In the uncoordinated
case, the eavesdroppers perform the interception independently
and the CUi-CBS transmission is secure when all N eaves-
droppers fail to decode the signal xi. Thus, the overall capacity
of the wiretap channel from CUi to N eavesdroppers can be
given by the maximum of individual achievable rates at N
eavesdroppers, yielding
Cie = max
ej∈E
Ciej = max
ej∈E
log2(1 +
I|hiej |
2
|hip|2Nej
), (6)
for the uncoordinated case, where E denotes the set of N
eavesdroppers. In the coordinated case, N eavesdroppers first
combine their received signals to obtain an enhanced version
for the sake of improving the possibility of successfully de-
coding the signal xi. Considering the maximal ratio combining
(MRC) and using (4), we obtain a combined version of the
received signals at N eavesdroppers as
yie =
∑
ej∈E
√
I
|hip|2
|hiej |
2xi +
∑
ej∈E
h∗iejnej ,
from which the overall capacity of the wiretap channel from
CUi to N eavesdroppers is given by
Cie = log2[1 +
I(
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2)2
|hip|2
∑
ej∈E
(|hiej |
2Nej )
], (7)
for the coordinated case. As discussed in [8] and [9], the
secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions is shown as the
difference between the capacity of the main channel and that of
the wiretap channel. Thus, we can obtain the secrecy capacity
of CUi-CBS transmission in the presence of N eavesdroppers
as
Csi = Cib − Cie, (8)
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where Cib is given by (3) and Cie is characterized by (6) and
(7) for the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, respectively.
Additionally, all the wireless channels shown in Fig. 1 (i.e.,
hip, hib and hiej ) are characterized with the Rayleigh fading
model. The average channel gains of |hip|2, |hib|2 and |hiej |2
are denoted by σ2ip, σ2ib and σ2iej , respectively. Moreover,
although only the Rayleigh fading model is considered in this
paper, similar performance analysis can be obtained for other
fading channel models (e.g., Nakagami model).
III. MULTI-USER SCHEDULING SCHEMES AND SECRECY
OUTAGE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present several multi-user scheduling
schemes including the round-robin scheduling, the optimal
user scheduling, and the suboptimal user scheduling in the
presence of the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers.
The optimal user scheduling is aimed to maximize the secrecy
capacity of the cognitive transmissions from CUs to CBS,
assuming that the CSIs of all CUs-CBS, CUs-PR, and CUs-Ej
links are available. By contrast, the suboptimal user scheduling
only assumes that the CSIs of CUs-CBS links are known,
attempting to address the multi-user scheduling without the
PR’s and eavesdroppers’ CSI knowledge. The closed-form
secrecy outage probability expressions of the round-robin
scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling
are also derived for both the uncoordinated and coordinated
eavesdroppers.
A. Round-Robin Scheduling
This subsection presents the conventional round-robin
scheduling as a benchmark. With the round-robin scheduling,
M CUs take turns in accessing the licensed spectrum and thus
each user has an equal chance to transmit its signal to CBS.
As is known, a secrecy outage event occurs when the secrecy
capacity drops below a predefined secrecy rate Rs. Thus, given
that CUi transmits to CBS, the secrecy outage probability of
CUi-CBS transmission is obtained as
Pout,i = Pr (C
s
i < Rs) , (9)
where Csi is given by (8). Substituting (3) and (6) into (8) and
combining with (9) yield
Pout,i = Pr
(
max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
>
1
2RsNb
|hib|
2 −
2Rs − 1
2RsI
|hip|
2
)
,
(10)
for the uncoordinated case, which is further obtained as (see
Appendix A)
Pout,i =
σ2ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb +
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNbI
σ
−2
ib
2RsNb+
∑
ej∈En
(σ−2
iej
Nej )
σ2ibI + σ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
,
(11)
where N is the number of eavesdroppers, En represents the
n-th non-empty subset of the elements of E , and |En| is
the cardinality of set En. Additionally, it is observed from
(7) that obtaining a general closed-form expression of the
secrecy outage probability Pout,i for the coordinated case
is challenging. For simplicity, we assume that the fading
coefficients of all CUi-Ej channels |hiej |2 are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables for different
eavesdroppers with the same average channel gain denoted by
σ2ie = E(|hiej |
2). This assumption is widely used and valid
in a statistical sense when all eavesdroppers are uniformly
distributed around CUs. Moreover, proceeding as Appendix
A and assuming that different eavesdroppers have the same
noise variance of Nej = Ne, we can obtain the secrecy outage
probability Pout,i from (7), (8) and (9) as
Pout,i = 1−
σ2ibI
σ2ibI + σ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
(1 +
2Rsσ2ieNb
σ2ibNe
)−N ,
(12)
for the coordinated case. As aforementioned, the round-robin
scheduling scheme allows M CUs to take turns in accessing
the licensed spectrum and thus the secrecy outage probability
of the round-robin scheduling is the mean of M CUs’ secrecy
outage probabilities, yielding
P roundout =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Pout,i, (13)
where M is the number of CUs and Pout,i is given by (11) and
(12) for the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, respectively.
B. Optimal User Scheduling
In this subsection, we propose an optimal user scheduling
scheme for the sake of improving the security of the CUs-CBS
transmissions. Considering M CUs available in the cognitive
radio network, a CU with the highest secrecy capacity is
selected to access a given spectrum band. Therefore, using
(8), we can express the optimal user scheduling criterion as
Optimal User = argmax
i∈U
Csi , (14)
where U represents the set of CUs. Substituting (3) and (6)
into (14) gives
Optimal User = argmax
i∈U

 |hip|2 + I|hib|2N−1b
|hip|2 + Imax
ej∈E
|hiej |
2N−1ej

 ,
(15)
for the uncoordinated case. Moreover, substituting (3) and (7)
into (14) yields
Optimal User = argmax
i∈U


|hip|2 + I|hib|2N
−1
b
|hip|2 +
I(
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2)2
∑
ej∈E
(|hiej |
2Nej )

 ,
(16)
for the coordinated case. One can observe from (15) and
(16) that the CSIs |hib|2, |hip|2 and |hiej |2 of the CUi-
CBS, CUi-PR and CUi-Ej links as well as the number of
eavesdroppers N and the noise variance Nej are assumed in
determining the optimal user among M CUs. However, the
PR’s and eavesdroppers’ CSIs, the number of eavesdroppers,
and the noise variance may be unavailable in some cases. To
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this end, the following subsection will consider the multi-user
scheduling without the need of these information. Using (14),
the secrecy outage probability of the proposed optimal user
scheduling scheme can be obtained as
P optimalout = Pr
(
max
i∈U
Csi < Rs
)
=
∏
i∈U
Pr (Csi < Rs), (17)
where Csi is given by (8). Combining (9) and (17), we obtain
the secrecy outage probability of the optimal scheduling as
P optimalout =
∏
i∈U
Pout,i, (18)
where Pout,i is given by (11) and (12) for the uncoordinated
and coordinated cases, respectively.
C. Suboptimal User Scheduling
This subsection proposes a suboptimal user scheduling
scheme under the condition that only the CSIs of CUs-CBS
channels are available without knowing the CSI knowledge of
the primary receiver and eavesdroppers. Since only the CSIs
of CUs-CBS channels are known in this case, a CU with the
highest instantaneous fading gain to CBS is typically regarded
as the optimal user, yielding
Optimal User = argmax
i∈U
|hib|
2, (19)
where U represents the set of M CUs. It is observed from (19)
that only |hib|2 is needed in the suboptimal user scheduling
scheme without the PR’s and eavesdroppers’ CSIs |hip|2 and
|hiej |
2
. This is different from the aforementioned optimal
user scheduling scheme which requires the CSIs of all CUi-
CBS, CUi-PR and CUi-Ej channels (i.e., |hib|2, |hip|2, and
|hiej |
2). For notational convenience, let ‘o’ denote the optimal
user determined by (19). Thus, the secrecy capacity of the
transmission from the optimal user (o) to CBS in the presence
of N uncoordinated eavesdroppers is obtained as
Cso = Cob −max
ej∈E
Coej , (20)
where Cob and Coej , respectively, represent the channel ca-
pacities from the optimal user to CBS and to eavesdropper
Ej , which are given by
Cob = log2(1 +
|hob|2I
|hop|2Nb
), (21)
and
Coej = log2(1 +
|hoej |
2I
|hop|2Nej
), (22)
where |hob|2, |hop|2, and |hoej |2 represent fading coefficients
of the channels from the optimal user to CBS, to PR, and to
eavesdropper Ej , respectively. Combining (20)-(22), we obtain
the secrecy outage probability of the proposed suboptimal user
scheduling scheme as
P subout = Pr (C
s
o < Rs)
= Pr
(
2RsImax
ej∈E
|hoej |
2
Nej
>
I
Nb
|hob|
2 − (2Rs − 1)|hop|
2
)
,
(23)
for the uncoordinated case. By using the law of total prob-
ability and denoting t = I
Nb
|hib|2 − (2Rs − 1)|hip|2, (23) is
rewritten as
P subout =
M∑
i=1
Pr
(
2RsImax
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
> t, o = i
)
. (24)
Combining (19) and (24), we have
P subout =
M∑
i=1
Pr


2RsImax
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
> t,
max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < |hib|
2

. (25)
By using the result of Appendix B, the secrecy outage prob-
ability P subout is obtained from (25) as
P subout =
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
(
P subout,I − P
sub
out,II
)
+
M∑
i=1
P subout,III ,
(26)
for the uncoordinated case, where En represents the n-th non-
empty subset of the elements of E , P subout,I , P subout,II and P subout,III
are given by (B.11)-(B.12), (B.13)-(B.14) and (B.15) respec-
tively. The following presents the secrecy outage probability
analysis of the suboptimal user scheduling for the coordinated
eavesdroppers. As mentioned earlier in Section III-A, it is
challenging to obtain a general closed-form expression of the
secrecy outage probability for the coordinated case. We here
consider that the fading coefficients |hiej |2 for ej ∈ E are i.i.d.
with the same mean of σ2ie and different eavesdroppers have
the same noise variance of Ne. Hence, substituting Nej = Ne
into (7) and using the law of total probability, we obtain
the secrecy outage probability P subout of the suboptimal user
scheduling as (27) for the coordinated case, which is further
given by (see Appendix C)
P subout =
M∑
i=1
(Pout,I + Pout,II + Pout,III), (28)
where Pout,I , Pout,II and Pout,III are given by (C.13), (C.14)
and (C.15), respectively. So far, we have derived closed-form
secrecy outage expressions for the round-robin scheduling as
well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes in the
presence of the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers,
which will be used in Section V for conducting numerical
evaluation of the secrecy outage performance.
IV. SECRECY DIVERSITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the secrecy diversity performance
of multi-user cognitive transmissions in the presence of multi-
ple uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. Although
the closed-form secrecy outage expressions shown in (13),
(18), (26) and (28) can be used to show the transmission secu-
rity performance of various user scheduling schemes, they fail
to provide an intuitive insight into the impact of the number of
CUs and eavesdroppers on the cognitive transmission security.
As a consequence, this section presents the secrecy diversity
analysis of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal
and suboptimal scheduling schemes.
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P subout =
M∑
i=1
Pr

∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 >
Ne
2RsNb
|hib|
2 −
(2Rs − 1)Ne
2RsI
|hip|
2,max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < |hib|
2

 (27)
A. Round-Robin Scheduling
Let us consider the round-robin scheduling as a baseline for
comparison. First, the cognitive radio transmission is subject
to the primary QoS constraint i.e. the maximum tolerable inter-
ference level at PR I . Generally speaking, with an increasing
I , the secrecy outage probability of cognitive transmissions
decreases accordingly. From (11) and (13), we obtain
lim
I→∞
P roundout =
1
M
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNb
2RsNb +
∑
ej∈En
σ2ibσ
−2
iej
Nej
,
(29)
for the uncoordinated case. One can observe from (29) that as
the maximum tolerable interference level I tends to infinity,
the secrecy outage probability of the round-robin scheduling
scheme converges to a non-zero constant. From (1), an infinite
I means that the transmit power of CUs approaches infinity.
Hence, as the CUs’ transmit power increases to infinity, a
secrecy outage probability floor occurs. Notice that the secrecy
outage floor provides a lower bound on the secrecy outage
probability that a cognitive radio system can achieve with high
interference temperature. It is also meaningful and effective
to employ the secrecy outage floor as a metric to evaluate the
security performance of different signal processing techniques
in a cognitive radio system. For notational convenience, the
secrecy outage floor of the round-robin scheduling scheme
is denoted by P roundout,floor, i.e., P roundout,floor = lim
I→∞
P roundout .
Denoting σ2ib = θibσ2m and σ2iej = θiejσ
2
e , where σ2m and σ2e ,
respectively, represent the reference channel gain of the main
links from CUs to CBS and that of the wiretap links from CUs
to eavesdroppers, we may obtain the secrecy outage floor of
the round-robin scheduling scheme from (29) as
P roundout,floor =
1
M
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNb
2RsNb + λme
∑
ej∈En
θibθ
−1
iej
Nej
,
(30)
for the uncoordinated case, where λme = σ2m/σ2e is called the
main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER). The traditional diversity
gain is defined in [27] as
d = − lim
SNR→∞
logPe(SNR)
log SNR ,
where SNR stands for the signal-to-noise ratio and Pe(SNR)
represents the bit error rate as a function of SNR. However,
as the CUs’ transmit power increases to infinity, the secrecy
outage probability of (30) tends to a non-zero constant, which
makes the traditional diversity definition become inappropriate
for the secrecy outage analysis. It is also observed from
(30) that with an infinite transmit power, the secrecy outage
probability becomes nothing to do with the CUs-PR channel
hip and is mainly determined by the main channel hib and
eavesdropping channel hiej . Motivated by this observation,
we here define a secrecy diversity gain as an asymptotic ratio
of the logarithmic secrecy outage floor to the logarithmic
MER λme (i.e., the ratio between the reference gains of the
main channel and eavesdropping channel) as λme →∞ [28],
yielding
dround = − lim
λme→∞
log(P roundout,floor)
log(λme)
, (31)
which, in turn, results in the secrecy outage floor P roundout,floor
behaving as λ−droundme in high MER region. This also shows
that as MER increases, the secrecy outage floor P roundout,floor de-
creases faster with a higher diversity order dround. Therefore,
the secrecy diversity order can be used as a simple but effec-
tive metric to evaluate the secrecy outage floor performance,
especially in high MER region. Substituting (30) into (31),
we obtain the secrecy diversity of the round-robin scheduling
scheme as
dround = 1, (32)
for the uncoordinated case, which shows that the secrecy
diversity order of only one is achieved by the round-robin
scheduling scheme, when the eavesdroppers are independent
of each other in intercepting the cognitive transmissions. In
what follows, we analyze the secrecy diversity of the round-
robin scheduling for the coordinated case. Noting Nej > 0 and
using the inequality min
ej∈E
Nej
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 ≤
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2Nej ≤
max
ej∈E
Nej
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 into (7), we have
log2(1+
I
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
|hip|2max
ej∈E
Nej
) ≤ Cie ≤ log2(1+
I
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
|hip|2 min
ej∈E
Nej
),
(33)
which may be further given by
log2(1+
Imax
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
|hip|2max
ej∈E
Nej
) ≤ Cie ≤ log2(1+
NImax
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
|hip|2 min
ej∈E
Nej
),
(34)
which is obtained by using the inequality max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 ≤∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 ≤ N max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
, where N is the number of
eavesdroppers. Combining (33) and (34) with (9), we have
P lowerout,i ≤ Pout,i ≤ P
upper
out,i , (35)
where the lower and upper bounds P lowerout,i and P
upper
out,i are
given by
P lowerout,i = Pr


max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
max
ej∈E
Nej
>
1
2RsNb
|hib|
2
−
2Rs − 1
2RsI
|hip|
2

 , (36)
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and
Pupperout,i = Pr


N max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
min
ej∈E
Nej
>
1
2RsNb
|hib|
2
−
2Rs − 1
2RsI
|hip|
2

 , (37)
for the coordinated case. Comparing (36) and (37) with (10)
and using (30), we readily obtain
lim
I→∞
P lowerout,i =
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNb
2RsNb + λme
∑
ej∈En
θibθ
−1
iej
max
ej∈E
Nej
,
(38)
and
lim
I→∞
Pupperout,i =
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNb
2RsNb + λme
∑
ej∈En
θibθ
−1
iej
N−1 min
ej∈E
Nej
.
(39)
Combining (38) and (39) with (13) yields
1
M
M∑
i=1
lim
I→∞
P lowerout,i ≤ P
round
out,floor ≤
1
M
M∑
i=1
lim
I→∞
Pupperout,i ,
(40)
for the coordinated case. Substituting (40) into (31) and using
(38) and (39) give
1 ≤ dround ≤ 1, (41)
which can be further obtained from the squeeze theorem as
dround = 1, (42)
for the coordinated case. As shown in (32) and (42), no matter
whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not, the round-robin
scheduling scheme always achieves the diversity order of only
one. This also means that the round-robin scheme fails to
achieve any secrecy diversity benefits with multiple CUs.
B. Optimal User Scheduling
This subsection analyzes the secrecy diversity order of the
proposed optimal user scheduling scheme. Using (18) and
letting I →∞, we obtain the secrecy outage floor of the
optimal user scheduling scheme as
P optimalout,floor =
∏
i∈U
lim
I→∞
Pout,i, (43)
where lim
I→∞
Pout,i is further computed from (11) as
lim
I→∞
Pout,i =
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNb
2RsNb + λme
∑
ej∈En
θibθ
−1
iej
Nej
, (44)
for the uncoordinated case, where N is the number of eaves-
droppers, θib = σ2ib/σ2m, θiej = σ2iej /σ
2
e , and λme = σ2m/σ2e .
Substituting (44) into (43) gives
P optimalout,floor =
∏
i∈U

2
N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNb
2RsNbλ
−1
me +
∑
ej∈En
θibθ
−1
iej
Nej


·
(
1
λme
)M
,
(45)
where M is the number of CUs. Similarly to (31), the secrecy
diversity order of the optimal user scheduling scheme is
defined as
doptimal = − lim
λme→∞
log(P optimalout,floor)
log(λme)
. (46)
Substituting (45) into (46) yields
doptimal = M, (47)
for the uncoordinated case, which demonstrates that the
secrecy diversity order of M is achieved by the optimal
scheduling scheme when the eavesdroppers are independent
of each other in tapping the cognitive transmissions. Similarly
to (40), we may obtain the secrecy outage floor of the optimal
user scheduling as∏
i∈U
lim
I→∞
P lowerout,i ≤ P
optimal
out,floor ≤
∏
i∈U
lim
I→∞
Pupperout,i , (48)
for the coordinated case, where lim
I→∞
P lowerout,i and lim
I→∞
Pupperout,i
are given by (38) and (39), respectively. Substituting (48) into
(46), we have
M ≤ doptimal ≤M, (49)
from which the secrecy diversity of the optimal user schedul-
ing scheme is readily obtained as
doptimal = M, (50)
for the coordinated case. It is seen from (47) and (50) that
for both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers,
the optimal user scheduling achieves the diversity order of
M . This can also be interpreted as that the secrecy outage
probability floor of the optimal user scheduling behaves as
( 1
λme
)M in high MER region. Therefore, with an increasing
number of CUs, the secrecy outage floor of the optimal user
scheduling decreases significantly, showing its advantage over
the round-robin scheduling scheme.
C. Suboptimal User Scheduling
This subsection is focused on the secrecy diversity analysis
of the suboptimal user scheduling scheme. Let us first analyze
the secrecy outage floor of the suboptimal user scheduling
with an infinite I . From (25), we obtain (51) at the top of the
following page for the uncoordinated case. Considering that
|hiej |
2 and |hkb|2 are independent exponentially distributed
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P subout,floor = lim
I→∞
P subout =
M∑
i=1
Pr

2Rs max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
>
1
Nb
|hib|
2, max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < |hib|
2

 (51)
random variables with respective means σ2iej and σ
2
kb and
denoting |hib|2 = x, we can equivalently rewrite (51) as
P subout,floor =
M∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0

1− ∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2iej2
RsNb
)
)

×
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
)dx.
(52)
Using the binomial theorem,
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2
iej
2RsNb
)
)
can be expanded as
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2iej 2
RsNb
)
)
= 1−
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1 exp(−
∑
ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej 2
RsNb
),
(53)
where En represents the n-th non-empty subset of the elements
of E . Substituting (53) into (52) yields
P subout,floor =
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
σ2ib
∫ ∞
0
exp(−
x
σ2ib
)
× exp(−
∑
ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej 2
RsNb
)
×
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
dx.
(54)
Using the result of Appendix D, we have
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
1
=
x
σ2kb
, (55)
for λme →∞, where
1
= represents an equality with probability
1, and x is a random variable with the following PDF
g(x) =
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
−
∑
ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej 2
RsNb
), (56)
wherein 0 < x < ∞. Hence, letting λme → ∞ and
substituting (55) into (54) yield (57) for the uncoordinated
case. Similarly to (31), the secrecy diversity order of the
suboptimal user scheduling scheme is defined as
dsub = − lim
λme→∞
log(P subout,floor)
log(λme)
. (58)
Combining (57) and (58), we obtain the diversity order of the
suboptimal user scheduling as
dsub = M, (59)
for the uncoordinated case. Additionally, combining (3) and
(34), we may obtain the lower and upper bounds on the secrecy
outage probability floor of the suboptimal user scheduling
scheme as
P lowerout,floor ≤ P
sub
out,floor = lim
I→∞
P subout ≤ P
upper
out,floor, (60)
where P lowerout and P
upper
out are given by
P lowerout,floor =
M∑
i=1
Pr


2Rs max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
max
ej∈E
Nej
>
1
Nb
|hib|
2,
max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < |hib|
2

,
(61)
and
Pupperout,floor =
M∑
i=1
Pr


2RsN max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
min
ej∈E
Nej
>
1
Nb
|hib|
2,
max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < |hib|
2

,
(62)
for the coordinated case. Comparing (61) and (62) with (51)
and using (57), we similarly obtain (63) and (64) at the top
of the following page.
Substituting (60) into (58) and using (63) and (64), we
obtain the secrecy diversity of the suboptimal user scheduling
as
M ≤ dsub ≤M,
which results in
dsub = M, (65)
for the coordinated case. It can be observed from (59) and
(65) that no matter whether the eavesdroppers are coordinated
or not, the suboptimal user scheduling scheme achieves the
diversity order of M , which is the same as the optimal
user scheduling approach. It is worth mentioning that the
suboptimal user scheduling only needs the CSIs of CUs-CBS
links. However, the optimal user scheduling assumes that the
CSIs of all links from CUs to CBS, to PR and to Ej are known,
which makes it challenging to be applied in practical cognitive
radio systems. Therefore, from a practical perspective, the
suboptimal scheduling scheme is more attractive than the
optimal scheduling.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical comparison among the
round-robin scheduling, the optimal user scheduling and the
suboptimal user scheduling in terms of secrecy outage prob-
ability. Throughout the numerical secrecy outage evaluation,
we assume that the background noise and interference received
at any node in the cognitive radio network shown in Fig. 1
(including CBS and N eavesdroppers) have the same variance,
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P subout,floor =
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
θib
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
1
θkb
(
1
θibλme
+
∑
ej∈En
Nej
θiej 2
RsNb
)−M · (
1
λme
)M (57)
P lowerout,floor =
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
θib
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
1
θkb
(
1
θibλme
+
∑
ej∈En
max
ej∈E
Nej
θiej 2
RsNb
)−M · (
1
λme
)M (63)
Pupperout,floor =
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
θib
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
1
θkb
(
1
θibλme
+
∑
ej∈En
min
ej∈E
Nej
Nθiej2
RsNb
)−M · (
1
λme
)M (64)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus maximum allowable interference
level γI of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the
optimal user scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated
cases with M = 8, N = 4, Rs = 1 bit/s/Hz, λme = 10 dB, and σ2ib =
σ2ip = θib = θiej = 1.
i.e., Nb = Nej for ej ∈ E . For notational convenience, let λI
denote the ratio of the maximum allowable interference power
I to the noise variance Nb, i.e., γI = I/Nb.
Fig. 2 shows the secrecy outage probability versus the
maximum allowable interference level γI of the round-robin
scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling
schemes for the uncoordinated and coordinated cases by using
(13), (18), (26) and (28). Simulation results of the secrecy
outage probability for these three schemes are also provided
in this figure. It is observed from Fig. 2 that as the maximum
allowable interference level γI increases, the secrecy outage
probabilities of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal
user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes all
decrease. This can be explained that with an increasing γI ,
CUs are allowed to transmit with higher power, leading to a
decrease of the secrecy outage probability. One can see from
Fig. 2 that as γI increases beyond a certain value, these three
schemes converge to their respective secrecy outage proba-
bility floors, where the optimal and suboptimal scheduling
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rate Rs of the round-robin
scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling
schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with M = 8,
N = 4, λme = 10 dB, γI = 10 dB, and σ2ib = σ
2
ip = θib = θiej = 1.
schemes both have a lower secrecy outage floor than the
round-robin scheduling. Moreover, for both the uncoordinated
and coordinated cases, the optimal user scheduling strictly
outperforms the suboptimal user scheduling in terms of the
secrecy outage probability. Fig. 2 also illustrates that the
secrecy outage performance of the round-robin scheduling as
well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling corresponding
to the uncoordinated eavesdroppers is expectedly better than
that of these three schemes corresponding to the coordinated
eavesdroppers. This means that the eavesdroppers may col-
laborate with each other for the sake of degrading the secrecy
outage performance of cognitive transmissions. In addition, the
simulation results match well the theoretical secrecy outage
probabilities, confirming the correctness of the secrecy outage
analysis.
Fig. 3 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus secrecy
rate Rs of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user
scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes for both
the uncoordinated and coordinated cases. As shown in Fig. 3,
with an increasing secrecy rate Rs, the secrecy outage proba-
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability versus the number of eavesdroppers N of
the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal
user scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases
with M = 8, Rs = 1 bit/s/Hz, λme = 10 dB, γI = 10 dB, and σ2ib =
σ2ip = θib = θiej = 1.
bilities of these three schemes in the presence of coordinated
or uncoordinated eavesdroppers all increase accordingly. In
other words, when a higher secrecy rate Rs is adopted by
CUs for better throughput performance, it is less likely to
achieve the perfect secure transmission against eavesdropping
attacks. It is also seen from Fig. 3 that for both the coordinated
and uncoordinated cases, the optimal user scheduling scheme
achieves the best secrecy outage performance and the round-
robin scheduling performs the worst across the whole secrecy
rate region.
In Fig. 4, we show the secrecy outage probability versus the
number of eavesdroppers N of the round-robin scheduling, the
suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling
schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated eaves-
droppers. One can observe from Fig. 4 that as the number of
eavesdroppers N increases, the secrecy outage probabilities
of these three schemes all increase for both the uncoordinated
and coordinated cases. Nevertheless, given a certain number
of uncoordinated (or coordinated) eavesdroppers, the optimal
and suboptimal user scheduling schemes both perform better
than the round-robin scheduling in terms of the secrecy outage
probability.
Fig. 5 illustrates the secrecy outage probability versus the
number of CUs M of the round-robin scheduling as well
as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes for both
the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with a low MER
of λme = −3 dB, which means that the average channel
gain of the eavesdroppers is two times better than that of
the legitimate CUs. It is shown from Fig. 5 that upon in-
creasing the number of CUs, the secrecy outage probability
of the round-robin scheduling scheme keeps unchanged for
both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, showing no
security benefits achieved with an increasing number of CUs.
By contrast, the secrecy outage probabilities of the optimal
and suboptimal user scheduling schemes both significantly
decrease, as the number of CUs increases. Therefore, when
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus the number of CUs M of the
round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user
scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with
N = 2, Rs = 0.2 bit/s/Hz, λme = −3 dB, γI = 10 dB, and σ2ib = σ
2
ip =
θib = θiej = 1.
either the optimal or suboptimal user scheduling is adopted,
the security of cognitive transmissions may be improved by
increasing the number of CUs. In other words, upon increasing
the number of CUs, any target secrecy outage probability can
be guaranteed by relying on the optimal or suboptimal user
scheduling scheme even with a very low MER.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the secrecy outage and diver-
sity performance of a multi-user multi-eavesdropper cognitive
radio system, where CUs transmit to a common CBS with a
primary QoS constraint in the presence of multiple coordinated
or uncoordinated eavesdroppers. We have presented the round-
robin scheduling, optimal user scheduling and suboptimal user
scheduling schemes to protect the CUs-CBS transmissions
against the eavesdropping attacks. Closed-form expressions
of the secrecy outage probability of these three schemes
have been derived for both the coordinated and uncoordinated
cases. We have also conducted the secrecy diversity analysis
of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and
suboptimal user scheduling in the presence of the coordinated
and uncoordinated eavesdroppers. It has been proven that
no matter whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not, the
round-robin scheduling achieves the secrecy diversity order
of only one, whereas the optimal and suboptimal scheduling
schemes both obtain the diversity order of M , where M is
the number of CUs. Numerical results have demonstrated that
as the maximum allowable interference level increases, the
secrecy outage performance of the round-robin scheduling as
well as the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling improves
accordingly. Additionally, for both the coordinated and unco-
ordinated cases, the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling
schemes significantly outperform the round-robin scheduling
approach in terms of the secrecy outage probability.
In the present paper, we only studied the physical-layer
security of CUs-CBS transmissions without considering the
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PUs’ security for the primary network. In cognitive radio
networks, CUs and PUs typically share the same spectrum
band, thus the eavesdroppers may tap both the CUs’ and PUs’
transmissions. It is thus of high interest to investigate the
impact of the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers
on the security of both CUs and PUs. Considering the fact
that PUs have a higher priority than CUs in accessing the
licensed spectrum, we may impose a security constraint on the
PUs’ transmissions (e.g., the secrecy capacity, secrecy outage
probability, etc.) with an objective of maximizing the CUs’
security performance with the aid of some signal processing
techniques, e.g. multi-user scheduling and beamforming. Be-
sides, due to estimation errors in practical channel estimators,
the perfect CSI is impossible to be obtained. It is interesting
to further examine the impact of CSI estimation errors on the
secrecy outage performance of various scheduling schemes.
We leave these interesting problems for our future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF (11) AND (12)
For notational convenience, let X denote term
1
2RsNb
|hib|2 −
2Rs−1
2RsI
|hip|2, i.e., X = 12RsNb |hib|
2 −
2Rs−1
2RsI
|hip|2. Note that random variables |hib|2 and |hip|2
are exponentially distributed and independent of each other.
Denoting X1 = |hib|2 and X2 = |hip|2, we obtain the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X as
Pr (X < x) = Pr
(
1
2RsNb
X1 −
2Rs − 1
2RsI
X2 < x
)
, (A.1)
where −∞ < x <∞. For x < 0, (A.1) can be given by
Pr (X < x) =
σ2ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
σ2ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb + σ2ibI
× exp
(
2RsI
(2Rs − 1)σ2ip
x
)
,
(A.2)
where σ2ib = E(|hib|2) and σ2ip = E(|hip|2). Besides, for
x > 0, (A.1) is obtained as
Pr (X < x) = 1−
σ2ibI
σ2ibI + σ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
× exp
(
−
2RsNb
σ2ib
x
)
.
(A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), we can prove that the CDF of X
is first-order differentiable for −∞ < x < ∞ and obtain the
probability density function (PDF) of X as
fX(x) =


2RsNbI
A
exp
(
2RsIx
σ2ip(2
Rs − 1)
)
, x < 0
2RsNbI
A
exp
(
−
2RsNb
σ2ib
x
)
, x > 0,
(A.4)
where A = σ2ip(2Rs − 1)Nb + σ2ibI . Noting that |hiej |2 for
ej ∈ E are independent exponentially distributed random
variables with respective means of σ2iej for different eaves-
droppers, we can rewrite (10) as
Pout,i = 1− Pr
(
max
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
< X
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2iej
)
)
fX(x)dx.
(A.5)
Substituting (A.4) into (A.5) yields
Pout,i =1−
2RsNbI
σ2ibI + σ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
×
∫ ∞
0
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2iej
)
)
× exp(−
2RsNb
σ2ib
x)dx,
(A.6)
where term
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2
iej
)
)
can be expanded with
the binomial theorem as
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2iej
)
)
= 1−
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1 exp(−
∑
ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej
),
(A.7)
where N is the number of eavesdroppers, En represents the
n-th non-empty subset of the elements of E , and |En| is
the cardinality of set En. Substituting (A.7) into (A.6) and
performing the integration yield
Pout,i =
σ2ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb +
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+12RsNbI
σ−2
ib
2RsNb+
∑
ej∈En
(σ−2
iej
Nej )
σ2ibI + σ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
,
(A.8)
which is (11). Additionally, substituting (3), (7) and (8) into
(9) and assuming different eavesdroppers with the same noise
variance of Nej = Ne, we have
Pout,i = Pr

∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Ne
>
1
2RsNb
|hib|
2 −
2Rs − 1
2RsI
|hip|
2

 ,
(A.9)
for the coordinated case. For notational convenience, we
denote X = 1
2RsNb
|hib|2−
2Rs−1
2RsI
|hip|2 and Y =
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Ne
,
where the PDF of X is given by (A.4). Moreover, considering
that random variables |hiej |2 for ej ∈ E are i.i.d. with the
same mean of σ2ie, we obtain that Y is Gamma distributed
with the mean of Nσ
2
ie
Ne
, whose PDF is given by
fY (y) =
(Ne)
N
Γ(N)σ2Nie
yN−1 exp(−
Ney
σ2ie
), (A.10)
for y > 0, where N is the number of eavesdroppers. Noting
that random variables X and Y are independent and combining
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(A.4), (A.9) and (A.10), we obtain
Pout,i = 1− Pr (Y < X)
= 1−
σ2ibI
σ2ibI + σ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
(1 +
2Rsσ2ieNb
σ2ibNe
)−N ,
(A.11)
which is (12).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF (26)
Considering that |hib|2 and |hip|2 are independent exponen-
tially distributed and denoting X = |hib|2 and Y = |hip|2, we
can easily obtain the joint PDF of random variables (X, Y )
as
f(x, y) =
1
σ2ibσ
2
ip
exp(−
x
σ2ib
−
y
σ2ip
), (B.1)
for (x > 0, y > 0). Thus, we can rewrite (25) as
P subout =
M∑
i=1
Pr


2RsImax
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
>
I
Nb
X − (2Rs − 1)Y ,
max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < X


=
M∑
i=1
∫∫
Pr
(
2RsImax
ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
>
I
Nb
x− (2Rs − 1)y
)
× Pr

max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < x

 f(x, y)dxdy,
(B.2)
where the second equation arises from the fact that ran-
dom variables |hiej |2 and |hkb|2 (for ej ∈ E and
k ∈ U) are independent of each other. Noting that
|hiej |
2 and |hkb|2 are exponential random variables with
respective means σ2iej and σ
2
kb, (B.2) can be further
obtained as (B.3) at the top of the following page,
where Ω =
{
(x, y)|N−1b Ix− (2
Rs − 1)y > 0
}
and Φ ={
(x, y)|N−1b Ix− (2
Rs − 1)y < 0
}
. By using the binomial
theorem, term
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
NejN
−1
b
Ix−Nej (2
Rs−1)y
σ2
iej
2RsI
)
)
is
expanded by
∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
NejN
−1
b Ix−Nej (2
Rs − 1)y
σ2iej 2
RsI
)
)
= 1−
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1 exp(−
∑
ej∈En
NejN
−1
b Ix−Nej (2
Rs − 1)y
σ2iej 2
RsI
),
(B.4)
where En represents the n-th non-empty subset of the elements
of E and |En| is the cardinality of set En. Similarly, we can
obtain term
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(− x
σ2
kb
)
)
as
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
= 1−
2M−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Um|+1 exp(−
∑
k∈Um
x
σ2kb
),
(B.5)
where Um represents the m-th non-empty subset of the ele-
ments of U − {CUi}, ‘−’ represents the set difference, and
|Um| is the cardinality of set Um. Substituting (B.4) and (B.5)
into (B.3) yields
P subout =
M∑
i=1
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
(
P subout,I − P
sub
out,II
)
+
M∑
i=1
P subout,III ,
(B.6)
where P subout,I , P subout,II and P subout,III are given by
P subout,I =
∫∫
Ω
exp(−
∑
ej∈En
NejN
−1
b Ix−Nej (2
Rs − 1)y
σ2iej 2
RsI
)
× f(x, y)dxdy,
(B.7)
and
P subout,II =
2M−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Um|+1
∫∫
Ω
exp(−
∑
k∈Um
x
σ2kb
)
× exp(−
∑
ej∈En
NejN
−1
b Ix−Nej (2
Rs − 1)y
σ2iej2
RsI
)
× f(x, y)dxdy,
(B.8)
and
P subout,III =
∫∫
Φ

1− 2
M−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Um|+1 exp(−
∑
k∈Um
x
σ2kb
)


× f(x, y)dxdy.
(B.9)
Combining (B.1) and (B.7), we obtain
P subout,I =
∫ ∞
0
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
−
∑
ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej2
RsNb
)dx
×
∫ Ix
(2Rs−1)Nb
0
1
σ2ip
exp(−
y
σ2ip
)
× exp(
∑
ej∈En
Nej (2
Rs − 1)y
σ2iej2
RsI
)dy,
(B.10)
which is further computed as
P subout,I =
I( 1
σ2
ib
+
∑
ej∈En
Nej
σ2iej
2RsNb
)−2
σ2ibσ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
,
(B.11)
for
∑
ej∈En
(2Rs−1)Nej
σ2
iej
2RsI
= 1
σ2
ip
. Moreover, if
∑
ej∈En
(2Rs−1)Nej
σ2
iej
2RsI
6=
1
σ2
ip
, we can obtain P subout,I from (B.10) as
P subout,I =
(1 +
∑
ej∈En
σ2ibNej
σ2
iej
2RsNb
)−1 − (1 + σ
2
ibI
σ2
ip
(2Rs−1)Nb
)−1
1−
∑
ej∈En
σ2
ip
Nej (2
Rs−1)
σ2iej
2RsI
.
(B.12)
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P subout =
M∑
i=1
∫∫
Ω

1− ∏
ej∈E
(
1− exp(−
NejN
−1
b Ix−Nej (2
Rs − 1)y
σ2iej2
RsI
)
)
 ∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
f(x, y)dxdy
+
M∑
i=1
∫∫
Φ
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
f(x, y)dxdy
(B.3)
Similarly, substituting (B.1) into (B.8) yields
P subout,II =
2M−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Um|+1I(B +
∑
ej∈En
Nej
σ2
iej
2RsNb
)−2
σ2ibσ
2
ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
,
(B.13)
for
∑
ej∈En
(2Rs−1)Nej
σ2
iej
2RsI
= 1
σ2
ip
, wherein B = 1
σ2
ib
+
∑
k∈Um
1
σ2
kb
. In
case of
∑
ej∈En
(2Rs−1)Nej
σ2
iej
2RsI
6= 1
σ2
ip
, we obtain P subout,II as
P subout,II =
2M−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Um|+1
(σ2ibB +
∑
ej∈En
σ2ibNej
σ2
iej
2RsNb
)−1
1−
∑
ej∈En
σ2
ip
Nej (2
Rs−1)
σ2
iej
2RsI
−
2M−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Um|+1
(σ2ibB +
σ2ibI
σ2
ip
(2Rs−1)Nb
)−1
1−
∑
ej∈En
σ2
ip
Nej (2
Rs−1)
σ2
iej
2RsI
.
(B.14)
In addition, combining (B.1) and (B.9), we obtain P subout,III as
P subout,III =
(
1 +
σ2ibI
σ2ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
)−1
−
2M−1−1∑
m=1
(−1)|Um|+1
(
σ2ibB +
σ2ibI
σ2ip(2
Rs − 1)Nb
)−1
,
(B.15)
where B = 1
σ2
ib
+
∑
k∈Um
1
σ2
kb
. Finally, substituting (B.11)-(B.15)
into (B.6) yields (26).
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF (28)
Denoting |hib|2 = X , |hip|2 = Y and
∑
ej∈E
|hiej |
2 = Z , we
can rewrite (27) as
P subout =
M∑
i=1
Pr


Z >
Ne
2RsNb
X −
(2Rs − 1)Ne
2RsI
Y,
max
k∈U
k 6=i
|hkb|
2 < X

. (C.1)
Considering that the fading coefficients |hiej |2 for ej ∈ E
are i.i.d. with the same mean of σ2ie, we readily obtain
that the random variable z is Gamma distributed with the
mean of Nσ2ie. Since |hib|2 and |hip|2 are independent and
exponentially distributed with respective means of σ2ib and σ2ip,
we obtain the joint PDF of (X,Y, Z) as
f(x, y, z) =
zN−1
Γ(N)σ2ibσ
2
ipσ
2N
ie
exp(−
x
σ2ib
−
y
σ2ip
−
z
σ2ie
), (C.2)
for (x, y, z) > 0. Noting that |hkb|2 and |hib|2 are independent
exponential random variables and combining (C.1) and (C.2),
we have
P subout =
M∑
i=1
∫∫∫
Θ
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
f(x, y, z)dxdydz,
(C.3)
where Θ =
{
(x, y, z)|z > Ne
2RsNb
x− (2
Rs−1)Ne
2RsI
y
}
. Noting
(x, y, z) > 0, we may divide Θ into two mutually exclusively
sets i.e. Θ1 and Θ2, where Θ1 and Θ2 are given by
Θ1 =

(x, y, z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N−1b Ix− (2
Rs − 1)y > 0,
z >
Ne
2RsNb
x−
(2Rs − 1)Ne
2RsI
y

 , (C.4)
and
Θ2 =
{
(x, y, z)|N−1b Ix− (2
Rs − 1)y < 0, z > 0
}
. (C.5)
By using (x, y, z) > 0, Θ1 can be further divided into two
mutually exclusively sets Θ11 and Θ12, which are described
as
Θ11 =


(x, y, z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ix
(2Rs − 1)Nb
> y,
y >
Ix
(2Rs − 1)Nb
−
2RsIz
(2Rs − 1)Ne
,
Ne
2RsNb
x− z > 0


,
(C.6)
and
Θ12 =

(x, y, z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ix
(2Rs − 1)Nb
> y > 0,
Ne
2RsNb
x− z < 0

 . (C.7)
Substituting Θ = Θ11 ∪Θ12 ∪Θ2 into (C.3) yields
P subout =
M∑
i=1
(Pout,I + Pout,II + Pout,III), (C.8)
where Pout,I , Pout,II and Pout,III are given by
Pout,I =
M∑
i=1
∫∫∫
Θ11
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
f(x, y, z)dxdydz,
(C.9)
IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 14
and
Pout,II =
M∑
i=1
∫∫∫
Θ12
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
f(x, y, z)dxdydz,
(C.10)
and
Pout,III =
M∑
i=1
∫∫∫
Θ2
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
f(x, y, z)dxdydz.
(C.11)
Substituting (C.2) and (C.6) into (C.9) yields
Pout,I =
∫ ∞
0
zN−1
Γ(N)σ2Nie
exp(−
z
σ2ie
)dz
×
∫ ∞
2RsNbz
Ne
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
)
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
)
dx
×
∫ Ix
(2Rs−1)Nb
Ix
(2Rs−1)Nb
− 2
RsIz
(2Rs−1)Ne
1
σ2ip
exp(−
y
σ2ip
)dy,
(C.12)
where the term
∏
k∈U
k 6=i
(
1− exp(− x
σ2
kb
)
)
may be expanded to
2M−1−1∑
m=0
(−1)|Um| exp(−
∑
k∈Um
x
σ2
kb
) by using the Binomial the-
orem, wherein
∑
k∈Um
x
σ2
kb
= 0 for Um = U0 and U0 represents
an empty set. Substituting this result into (C.12), we obtain
(C.13) at the top of the following page. Similarly, substituting
(C.2) and (C.7) into (C.10) yields (C.14) at the top of the
following page.
Pout,II =
(−1)|Um|(σ2Nie − C
−N )
σ2ibσ
2N
ie (σ
−2
ib +
∑
k∈Um
σ−2kb )
−
(−1)|Um|[σ2Nie − (C +
2RsI
(2Rs−1)σ2
ip
Ne
)−N ]
σ2ibσ
2N
ie [B + I(2
Rs − 1)−1σ−2ip N
−1
b ]
,
(C.14)
where B = 1
σ2
ib
+
∑
k∈Um
1
σ2
kb
and C = 1
σ2
ie
+ 2
RsNb
σ2
ib
Ne
+∑
k∈Um
2RsNb
σ2
kb
Ne
. Additionally, substituting (C.2) and (C.5) into
(C.11), we have
Pout,III =
2M−1−1∑
m=0
(−1)|Um|
(
σ2ibB +
Iσ2ib
(2Rs − 1)σ2ipNb
)−1
,
(C.15)
where B = 1
σ2
ib
+
∑
k∈Um
1
σ2
kb
. This completes the derivation of
(28).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF (55)
Without loss of generality, let z denote x
σ2
kb
, i.e., z = x
σ2
kb
.
Thus, the mean of random variable z is obtained as
E(z) =
1
σ2kb
E(x), (D.1)
which can be further computed from (56) as
E(z) =
1
σ2kb
∫ ∞
0
x
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
−
∑
ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej 2
RsNb
)dx
=
1
σ2kbσ
2
ib

 1
σ2ib
+
∑
ej∈En
Nej
σ2iej 2
RsNb


−2
.
(D.2)
Denoting σ2kb = θkbσ2m, σ2ib = θibσ2m and σ2iej = θiejσ
2
e , we
can rewrite (D.2) as
E(z) =
1
θkbθib

 1
θibλme
+
∑
ej∈En
Nej
θiej2
RsNb


−2
· (
1
λme
)2,
(D.3)
where λme = σ
2
m
σ2e
. Meanwhile, we can also obtain the mean
of z2 as
E(z2) =
1
θ2kbθib

 1
θibλme
+
∑
ej∈En
Nej
θiej2
RsNb


−3
· (
1
λme
)3.
(D.4)
One can observe from (D.3) and (D.4) that for λme →∞, both
E(z) and E(z2) tend to zero. This implies that as λme →∞,
random variable z approaches zero with probability 1, yielding
z
1
= 0 for λme →∞, where
1
= denotes an equality with
probability 1. Also, from the Maclaurin series expansion and
the Cauchy’s Mean-Value theorem, we obtain
1− exp(−z) = z +
z2
2
exp(−θz), (D.5)
where 0 < θ < 1. From (D.5), we have
lim
λme→∞
1− exp(−z) = z + lim
λme→∞
z2
2
exp(−θz). (D.6)
Similarly to (D.3) and (D.4), we can easily prove that for
λme →∞, the mean and variance of z2 are high-order
infinitesimals as compared with the mean and variance of
z. Meanwhile, due to 0 < θ < 1 and z > 0, we have
0 < exp(−θz) < 1. Thus, term z
2
2 exp(−θz) is high-order
infinitesimal compared to z, as λme →∞. Ignoring the high-
order infinitesimal in (D.6) yields
lim
λme→∞
1− exp(−z)
1
= z. (D.7)
Substituting z = x
σ2
kb
into (D.7) yields
1− exp(−
x
σ2kb
)
1
=
x
σ2kb
, (D.8)
for λme →∞, which is (55).
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